Category Archives for "High Yield Strategy"
After an early to mid-May hitting of the proverbial brick wall, credit spreads have resumed their tightening trend. In the high yield market, the Markit iBoxx index has tightened by 14bp in the month to B+641bp – or by 35bp against the mid-May wide. There will be no miracle ratchet tighter because a lot of bad news is still to come, but we are unlikely going to witness a massive blowout in spreads either. We anticipate a steady tightening in credit spreads as macro recovers.
We’ve had more than what could be deemed a spate of issuance, too, with €3.8bn HY debt issued in the euro-denominated market, although we did have Sappi pull their deal as market volatility abruptly ended their ambitions. We don’t doubt that they will be back.
The corporate bond market has made a good comeback of late, mostly evident in the investment grade primary sector. The issuance pace is running at record levels and while April’s monthly deal flow was in itself a record (€57bn), May’s current total suggests it could even surpass that.
Importantly, the reopening of the investment grade market has provided somewhat of a boost to high yield primary. After having drawn a complete blank in the Feb 20 – 15 April period, we’ve since had around €5bn of issuance. Verisure reopened the market, but the likes of Netflix, Stada, Nokia and Synlab have followed.
The BoE has forecast a 14% contraction in the UK economy for 2020 and as much as a 30% in Q2 before roaring back into life in 2021 with a 15% bounce back. So, a painful, temporary collapse but a V-shaped recovery. Across the Eurozone and US, we are witnessing similar patterns with manufacturing and services activity at record lows.
Risk markets have already started to look beyond the economic malaise which will be inflicted in Q2. Equities are holding relatively firm, taking on the incoming macro and corporate earnings data on the chin somewhat. The credit markets have seen record levels of monthly issuance IG and we are seeing the beginning of a thaw in the high yield primary markets.
Credit spreads generally recovered hard following the initial pandemic-driven lockdown weakness, but even in the high yield market, the weakness was nowhere close to the levels seen at the height of the 2008 financial crisis. So we appear to have found a floor reflecting the expectation that markets will recover into H2 as lockdowns are relaxed and we hopefully avoid a second-wave virus shock. High yield spreads/prices have barely moved for several weeks.
Trading into that narrative, we took a look at the NewDay bonds and added a position to our holdings of HY debt, for the reasons listed below. The 18% yield to maturity was also a driver for our investment.
Also see: Our bond portfolio
NewDay (ticker: NEMEAN) is a leading UK credit card issuer – specialising in ‘near-prime’ and prime customers. ‘Near-Prime’ is defined as those who may find it difficult to access credit from mainstream lenders, and it is estimated that between 10-14m UK adults are ‘near-prime’ which is approx. 20-25% of the UK adult population.
100% of the company’s revenues are generated in the UK. Competition for the ‘near-prime’ segment comes from Capital One and Vanquis Bank. NewDay is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
The group operates ‘own-brand’ credit cards – issued from NewDay’s brands ‘Aqua’ and ‘Marbles’ and ‘co-brands’ credit cards – which are cards issued via corporate partners.
These ‘co-brands’ are often issued by retail stores and online retailers (House of Fraser, Debenhams and Arcadia Group: which includes Topman, Topshop, Miss Selfridge, Burton, Dorothy Perkins and Amazon).
Historically, revenues between ‘own brand’ and ‘co-brand’ have been slightly skewed towards ‘own brand’ but over the past 3 years, its share of FY revenue has been decreasing: FY17 (61% of revenues attributed to ‘own brand’), FY18 (60%) and FY19 (58%).
NewDay is owned by private equity firms: CVC (45%) Cinven (45%) with management owning the rest of the company (10%). It was acquired by CVC and Cinven in October 2016 from Varde Partners for £1bn.
NewDay FY19 results: +15% growth year-on-year on receivables to £3,026m from £2,623m in FY18. Adjusted EBITDA increased to £144m for FY19 from £82m in FY18. Income increased 14% year-on-year, mainly driven by own-brand cards (£676m in FY19 from £591m in FY18.
Net leverage decreased to 1.9x from 2.6x in Q3’19. Provisions also decreased to £20.9m for FY19 from £35.7m in FY18.
The credit market is recovering admirably. We look to have passed peak-virus, even if we are nowhere close to being in the clear. The stimulus packages are helping. But Q2’s earnings numbers are going to be awful in terms of earnings and macroeconomic activity continues to be depressed. But we look beyond that – and the potential for a V-recovery, at worst a shallow W-shaped return to health.
The tone is already improving. Playing into that, there is the rising tide of better equities lifting other markets. Credit spreads have already started their recovery trajectory and we see further potential for a high/low beta compression trade to continue. It’s laboured, admittedly, and will likely stay that way until we get a better handle on the recovery dynamics.
That brings us to the Saga 3.375% May 2024s. A punt? Given the devastation in the travel – and especially the cruise industry, yes. The headline risks are not to be understated. We have taken only a small position based on the view that (for the moment) the group still benefits from a good liquidity position, has suspended dividends with debt holiday/covenant waivers being negotiated for their cruise business (30% of EBITDA).
As a sophisticated investor, we have done this by adding the Saga sterling issue into our new investment portfolio through the WiseAlpha platform.
Also see: Our bond portfolio
These are the reasons why we’ve chosen Saga:
Established in 1950, Saga (ticker: SAGALN) is a provider of insurance and travel products for the over-50s in the UK (100% of revenue is generated in the UK FY16). Insurance products include motor insurance and home insurance policies whilst the travel business offers cruises and package holidays – Saga owns two cruise ships: Saga Sapphire and Spirit of Discovery (delivered in June 2019 at a cost of €380m).
The firm has ordered a third cruise ship – Spirit of Adventure – which is due for delivery in 2020. The entire business is focused on the over-50s and this a wealthy, growing demographic (ONS 2018 Wealth Report). Further, as part of its business involves insurance – the group is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
The high yield market will likely see a re-opening in primary through Verisure, suggesting that investors are ready to re-enter the market, initially on a cautious and selective basis. That deal is for just €150m and a 5NC1 structure. Nevertheless, it’s the first throw of the dice for a sector otherwise bereft a new deal since 20 February.
The news flow around the sector has been difficult and the market has been in defensive fashion since the coronavirus pandemic hammered risk assets. The recent equity market revival and the Fed stimulus package which has boosted US high yield has had a positive impact on the market in Europe.
Spreads, as measured by the index have recovered almost 30% of their weakness, leaving the iBoxx index at B+646bp (-270bp). The market remains very illiquid, the ability to transact at a reasonable price on the way up or down is poor, but there are pockets of liquidity emerging and opportunities presented as a result.
We have taken a look at the UK retail/food sector and, while high yield rated entities in this sector have come under pressure as a result of the weaker sentiment towards high yield per se, the food sector has had a better time of it as the population has hoarded ahead of – and into – the lockdown.
As a retail investor looking for sub-par paper which should be ‘money good’ (in our view) offering a very good yield, at creditmarketdaily.com we have decided to take a position. We have done this by adding the Iceland sterling issue into our new investment portfolio through the WiseAlpha platform.
Also see: Our bond portfolio
These are the reasons why we’ve chosen Iceland:
A UK-based food retailer, with 1,013 stores (976 UK ‘Iceland’ Stores and 119 ‘Food Warehouse’ stores). The business positions itself at the value-end of the retail market and currently holds 2.2% of the UK grocery market. Competition comes from established grocery supermarkets such as Tesco, Asda and Morrisons and value-end discounter retailers such as Aldi and Lidl.
87% of Iceland’s customers are C1, C2 and DE demographic (clerical, junior administrative jobs, skilled manual workers, semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations and unemployed) – the most of any other food retailer – therefore it occupies a unique space in the grocery market.
Generally, the business revenues are split into three (LTM-June-2017) equal segments:
In the frozen food segment – ICELTD holds a 15.4% market share. This is the second-largest in the UK and is a key in the company’s strategy to position itself as a differentiated value offering – in essence, in between established supermarkets and discount retailers.
63.1% owned by Brait (first stake acquired in March 2012). 36.9% owned by management.
Net Leverage 5.5x (up from 4.9x y-on-y) as of January 2020.
Revenue increased +2.5%, but it was a challenging quarter as a result of the UK general election. Gross profit was -14% lower at £99m (from £113m in Q3 FY19).
EBITDA declined by 8% for the same period, to £81m. Net leverage increased to 5.5x from 4.9x at Q3 FY19 (last year) to Jan 2020.
There was a large working capital outflow of £33m and this was attributed to trade payments going forward. The company said that will increase going forward as the Swindon Warehouse (which will cost an additional £6m in working capital next year) is opened, but this does add additional capacity for increased sales.
FY2020 will be less than that last year at around £50m (FY19 £63.5m). Please note these results were pre-COVID19 lockdown.
In my last note, I suggested a rotation from more expensive BBs into Bs as a means of reducing systematic risk and in preparation for a squeeze in yields as we enter the year-end period. YTD performance and valuations all point to caution as we enter the home straight. Q3 earnings will be critical in determining who is on the right side of the “Earnings Recession” debate. Over the next few notes, I plan on identifying those safe places to hide as well as (try) to develop a valuation framework for the asset class.
The old Chinese curse (May you live in interesting times) is certainly applicable to credit investors. Last week’s power moves by Draghi have yet to sink in and, added to that, rising oil prices are increasing concerns of constraining sluggish growth.
Systematic drivers (read rates, and a declining but stable economic background) could see spread compression increase. In an intensified hunt for yield, I wonder just how much incremental QE directly supports credit fundamentals.
Clearly, easy money and low lending rates have made for low defaults. But given the amount of cash already in the system, the marginal benefit is likely to have diminishing returns. “Zombie” companies that should have gone to the grave long ago are still with us.
They have been operating in an ‘easy money’ environment for some time and natural selection has yet to pick them off. Unless they refinance at lower rates risk it is hard to see how fundamentals will improve significantly for such companies. The one thing they do have is time.
I wanted to (at least start) to get a sense for this. The above chart shows the number of 5% plus moves by month of the Pan European High Yield Index, plotted against the 10 Yr Bund Yield.
It hopefully shows Systematic vs. Idiosyncratic risks. What’s more, you tend to see a decline in the idiosyncratic moves after a dose of yield compression. However – fundamentals will prevail.
So, it looks like the cost of getting it wrong will increase while at the same time spreads can compress further if our view of IG/ HY compression takes hold.
Fundamentals look to have softened slightly and a continuation into Q3 could put that cat amongst the pigeons – Especially ahead of QE restarting.
We analysed the fundamentals of 300+ issuers and calculated several metrics – leverage, coverage and cash flow. The number of issuers was roughly 73% of the Pan Euro High Yield Index. Outliers were removed and then the straight average was calculated.
Ideally, in the future, this can be done on an issuer weighted basis as well as digging into the trends seen in specific issuers. High Yield is seeing an increase in data providers and leveraging them for screens and other studies will hopefully deliver more insight.
The table below shows that leverage has increased on average since 2016, with Energy and Transportation showing a decline in leverage at the aggregate level Q2 ’19 vs. FY 18.
Rating-wise, the story is the same. BBs edging higher vs. Q4 ’18 +11% vs. Bs +2%. Which suggests some slippage in quality, plus the influence of new issues.
We use Funds from Operations to look at both the ability of Issuers to pay back debt and in terms of interest coverage. YTD and YoY there is little to cheer about with FFO down across the board. Consumer-facing and cyclical sectors down the most. Ratings-wise, BBs show a steeper decline YTD than Bs but fare much better on YoY and comparison against FY16.
Interest cover at the aggregate level looks relatively healthy, with any “zombies” lost in the mix. Most segments have seen a decline based on recent history and point to a softening YTD and YoY.
Overall, the moves are not huge – but they are significant. A further decline would represent reasons for increased caution. Overall, the softness does look to be cyclical. Clearly, we have to be mindful of mix when extrapolating to the wider market.
There is an ever-growing list of “known knowns“ to contend with– distorted relative value, aggressive deals with weak covenants, additional financial stimulus, declining margins of error, geopolitics and a softening economy. The key is picking your spots into Q3.
“Complacency” is something that one does not often associate with the High Yield market where it pays to be a skeptic.
Whilst “Animal Spirits” may not be rampant, there are signs of frothiness. The recent Pinewood Studio is a case in point. Split rated BBB/BB the business managed to print a £550mm deal of which £280mm (51%) was a dividend.
The deal printed at 3.25%, and after tax that is roughly 2.8%. The cost of equity on the Euro Stoxx Real estate constituents is 6.6%. Pinewood managed to pay itself a dividend at a cost of 2.8%. The flip side is that debt investors are the ones effectively covering the additional risk – it is a zero-sum game. Pushing back on primary is going to become more and more important in sustaining that margin for error.
Fundamentals, though, are not flashing red yet, so well-rated dividend deals are a sign of the times rather than a sign of the end of times.
We remain comfortably numb awaiting our next dose from Dr Draghi, but positioning needs to stack up. Credit selection remains the number one priority with a view to managing downside. October looks to be a cash-rich month in terms of coupons and redemptions – some of the supply we are seeing now is pre-financing that but technicals look to be supportive near term. QE will drive compression between IG and High Yield, the risk is the fundamentals continue to slip and stimulus fails to keep a lid on volatility.
Next time, I plan on looking at curves and convexity. You can follow me on twitter @EuroYield.
Just how much have rates driven returns in the quality end of high yield? How much do spread returns in the Investment grade market explain returns in the BB space? Are BB’s cheap? Where could spreads go?
There has been much talk about the proportion of negatively yielding debt – even in European High Yield. Hopes are for the ECB to step in with a yield crushing solution in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, economic data has been softening, especially when you look at Germany and China.
Year to date BBs have outperformed single Bs by 192bps when looking at the Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Eur Index returning a not too shabby 9.84%. The BBB Euro Corporate AGG as returned a whopping 8.84% year to date, also outshining single Bs.
The Bloomberg Barclays Bundesrepublik Deutschland index has returned a 9.41% YTD. Who cares about credit risk??
Well – you should – especially if you are sitting on a decent year to date return. BBs are synonymous with quality, liquidity and low defaults. And yet we have seen Casino, Steinhoff, Dia and GE, to name a few, all nosedive in rating and price – credit risk is real. Liquidity is increasingly difficult to source, and gap risk has increased significantly over the past 12 months. If the name of the game is riding yields until they are negative then BBs certainly benefit from higher rate sensitivity, but from a credit standpoint are we doubling down? Calculating the R Squared of Excess Returns against Total returns for the BBB/BB/B corporate indices tells us just how much spread performance drives returns.
On average 2010-2018 spread looks to explain 13.44% of IG returns, for BBs and Bs the numbers are 29.62% and 34.4% respectively. The LTM figures are much higher 29.61%, 35.92% and 45.65% for BBBs, BBs and Bs respectively This is mainly a function of including 2018’s sell-off. Looking at the Bar chart you can see that spread has a larger influence on returns in times of stress – 2011, 2015,2018.
So, having enjoyed the ride is it time to take chips off the table? From a credit standpoint earnings have yet to take a turn for the worse. However, the “known” unknowns list is long now. Trump’s ability to send Xover wider one day and tighter the next is a prime example. Systematic factors likely demand caution, with idiosyncratic risk, the risk at the heart of the High Yield market yet to be influenced by the overall economy.
The linkage between rating buckets when it comes to spread performance is significant. Regressing weekly Excess returns of BBBs and BBs yields an R squared of 87%, and with BBs and Bs the figure is slightly lower at 80% reflecting the step up in default risk. Doing the same exercise on a total return basis the R squared regressing BBBs against BBs is much lower 37.5% compared to 77.8% for BBs vs. Bs.
The inference is that credit risk explains a large part in the return of BBs vs. BBBs. A key technical, demand from the “Investment Grade tourist”, is unlikely to endure in the context of spread underperformance. The Mean weekly return for BBs and BBBs 2010- to date are c. 33 and 17bps respectively, and BB excess return volatility is roughly 3x that of BBBs.
Looking at the spread ratio of BBs to BBBs it is hard to argue that BBs are cheap. The Ratio has averaged 1.97x since 2011 and currently sits at 1.7x. In the Dec-18 Sell off the ratio blew out to 2.56x. For context, this is roughly a 200bp widening relative to the BB index’s FY18 starting spread of 148. BBB spreads started the year at 68bps and ended at 148.
So relative to BBBs, BBs look relatively rich and certainly the downside volatility appears to be significant enough to perhaps take some chips off the table.
When it comes to BBs vs Single Bs the decision to take chips off the table come down to your willingness to take more credit risk. Doing a similar exercise with Bs and BBs the average weekly excess returns 2011- to date are similar +33bps vs. +35bps. Volatility of returns is also closer (but not insignificant) with Bs having a volatility roughly 1.6x that of BBs.
Looking at the spread ratio Single Bs vs. BBs the current value of 1.82x is practically the same as the 2011- to date average of 1.81x. Here the relationship looks fairly valued.
Credit selection is a somewhat consensus mantra. Given the margin for error at current spreads this makes perfect sense. Being overweight in the current environment assumes The ECB’s “Bazooka 3.0” will drive spreads tighter and yields lower, with the softness macro being more of an issue come 2020.
With 3 months to year-end and a significant YTD return and increasing uncertainty, taking some risk off is extremely tempting.
The CreditMarketDaily view is that we see further compression in High Yield vs. IG. Taking profits in BBs to rotate into Bs with positive credit momentum is a way to position for near term central bank action. Deep value – if your remit allows- is also a way to position for upside, given the nature of special situations they reduce your overall correlation with the wider market.
An underweight vs. the benchmark assumes that “Bazooka 3.0” does not cure all and that the cyclical decline worsens ahead of expectations. Given the risk-on – risk-off volatility maintaining a neutral position locks in returns and allows for some upside assuming credit selection is good.
Below is a spread summary covering November 2010 to date for the Bloomberg Barclays indices discussed. “Distance from the wides” shows how far current levels spreads are from the wides of the range.
A friend of mine likens the High Yield Market to an elastic band – the more it is stretched the more violent the snap back. If you were holding that elastic band right now, I suspect you would be holding it as far from your face as you can manage. It might not be fully stretched yet, but it has the potential to deliver a sting. Credit selection and an avoidance of outright beta should lessen it should we get the snap.
A tightening to the lows would result in an additional 2.4%,1.93% and 2.86% for the BBB, BB and B indices respectively. What gets us there is probably a combination of ECB not disappointing, continued corporate strength, Orderly Brexit and China trade tensions easing.
Impossible? No. Improbable? Maybe. Likely? You Hope.
On the 21st March 2019, we recommended:
‘TCGLN 3.875 23 currently trading at 67.5 have scope to fall further to 45 cash price…’
Our rationale was that there was much uncertainty regarding the nature of the disposal of TCGLN’s airline business. Further, the need for TCGLN to retain stronger liquidity meant that any cash proceeds from a sale of the airline business would rule out the possibility of bonds being taken out. Therefore, TCGLN is likely to be a small, lower-margin, less diversified business facing increased competition.
The trade P&L stands at a profit of +12.5pts, however, we believe the bonds have further to fall and maintain the short.
20 April 2019: Sky News reports that TCGLN ‘has been tentatively approached about a takeover of its tour operating unit or the entire company by several parties…’ EQT, KKR and Fosun (who already own 17% equity) rumoured to be interested.
3rd May 2019: S&P downgrades rating to B- (CW Negative) based on weak booking trends in Europe and the impact on cash flow and already weak liquidity position.
4th May 2019: £55m of TCGLN’s RCF (£650m due in 2022) was sold for a price of 60. Another bank is advertising £25m of RCF for sale at the same price.
5th May 2019: Sky News reports that TCGLN is seeking a £400M extension from lenders to boost its liquidity position. TCGLN said this was ‘to ensure we have both financial flexibility necessary to maintain an appropriate liquidity buffer through winter.’ As mentioned before, TCGLN has to maintain a liquidity buffer of £150-200m.
7 May 2019: Expressions of interest into TCGLN’s airline business deadline.
16 May 2019: H1 2019 results
|Issuer||Cpn||Maturity||CCY||S&P||Deal Size||Latest Px||YTW||Z-Spread|
|THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC||6.250||15/06/2022||EUR||B||750,000,000||€ 60.000||26.942||2546|
|THOMAS COOK FINANCE 2||3.875||15/07/2023||EUR||B||400,000,000||€ 55.000||20.634||1971|
|THOMAS COOK 5Y CDS||12/20/2023||EUR||31.00 (upfront)||1844|
|Index||CCY||Friday’s Close (29/03)||1W Change|
|iShares EUR HY ETF||EUR||103.4||1.2|
|iTraxx Crossover||EUR||269.5 bps||-11.5bps|
The sell-off on Friday (22/03/2019) was carried over into the beginning of the week just as we predicted in our inaugural HY Strategy Weekly last week and it looked like setting the agenda for spread direction. However, dovish remarks from ECB chairman Draghi about a potential tiered deposit rate for banks (which would significantly improve profitability) led to a significant bund rally and firmed HY credit sentiment.
It still feels that HY investors are underinvested in the asset class. This is due to a number of factors that were discussed last week such as positioning at the beginning of year, lack of supply (compared to YTD last year) and significant outflows in 2018 followed by inflows in 2019.
This means that if there continues to be weak but stable growth, dovish central banks and benign inflationary pressures, it could provide an environment for ‘reach of yield’ strategy scenario in which single Bs lead the outperformance in HY.
BORPLN (CCC+) fell -3pts lower after Q2 18/19 results on Weds (27/03) which disappointed significantly with net leverage increasing to 7.37x from 5.67x and EBITDA falling -24.1% however net debt was reduced to £570.0m from £788.7m. Bonds fell a further -2pts on Thursday and Friday.
ALTICE/ATCNA (B/CCC+) gained +1pt on Thursday (28/03) after solid results especially as management reiterated its aims of reaching 4.25x leverage within 24 months with a mix of growth and disposals.
TCGLN (B): bonds are trading around 66.5/67.5 area with no further news about the full or partial airline disposal but we reiterate our negative note from last week (21/03) in which we suggest shorting the credit.
LOXAM (BB): As we (correctly) pointed out in our LOXAM trade idea on 24/03 the company called the LOXAM 7 22 and LOXAM 4.875 21 on the first call date (01/04/2019) and issued a 265M and 200M offering (road showing until 3 April 2019. 5Y CDS has continued to widened to 279bps.
|Issuer||Cpn||Maturity||CCY||S&P||Deal Size||Latest Px||YTW||Z-Spread|
|LOXAM SAS||4.875||23/07/2021||EUR||BB-||239,300,000|| 101.500||-15.304||-2893|
|LOXAM SAS||3.500||15/04/2022||EUR||BB-||300,000,000|| 102.098||-1.464||-707|
|LOXAM SAS||3.500||03/05/2023||EUR||BB-||250,000,000|| 102.123||0.369||-261|
|LOXAM SAS||4.250||15/04/2024||EUR||BB-||300,000,000|| 104.718||1.755||156|
|LOXAM SAS||6.000||15/04/2025||EUR||B||250,000,000|| 105.125||3.956||376|
|LOXAM SAS||7.000||23/07/2022||EUR||B||225,000,000|| 104.092||-18.539||-3488|
|LOXAM 5Y CDS||06/20/2024||EUR||275|
LOXAM (BB) is a large equipment rental group offering over 1,500 different types of equipment, with approx. 760 branches, largely in France (65%). Major equipment includes Earthmoving (31% of sales), Aerial Platforms (21%), Building (12%), Handling (11%) and Energy (10%).
Competition is fragmented, LOXAM holds a 3.8% European market share (21% in France). Management owns 88% of the company, 3i 8% and Pragma Capital 4%