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Monthly Archives: December 2018

18th December 2018

Three (erstwhile) Kings in credit land | Bank Capital

A decade back in the land of mega-credit there were three big kings – GE as one of the biggest issuers, which used debt markets as a tool to grow its global reach by offering vendor financing, GS as one of the biggest originators and distributors in the debt capital markets and DB as one of the biggest market makers in the OTC credit products.

And all three entities seem to have lost their way. GE with its leveraged balance sheet has found it difficult to generate decent returns in its core businesses, GS has found that traditional investment banking needs low-cost funding and DB has a huge cost base problem and a bloated and capital-intensive fixed income business. Equity investors in all three entities have endured significant pain with sharp falls in their respective stock prices.

GE – leverage is always a problem

GE’s problems seem to be its huge debt pile and involvement in low/non-profitable businesses. Once a global leader in many industries, it has failed to properly read the big transformational changes in some of its businesses. GE’s stock has been hit hard as equity investors don’t seem to like what they see. On the other hand, credit investors have just started to fret about a potential ratings downgrade to junk, which may mean that traditional investment-grade funds may have to sell their holdings. Given the amount of debt issued by GE it seems that the potential transition from IG to junk may cause significant pain to current investors.


GS – Old issues not going away

GS wants to diversify away from the traditional investment banking business and wants to add a retail banking franchise. Given the ongoing shrinkage of the industry sales and trading revenues due to regulatory changes, disintermediation by newer players, automation etc, the firm has found it difficult to deliver strong earnings.

And now the firm is dealing with legacy litigation and compliance issues, which may yet see more reputational damage and impact revenue growth. As of now it still seems that these issues are more relevant for equity investors but if headlines continue to be negative, credit investors will be impacted given that the paper is issued out of the Holdco entity. And there is not much sub debt to absorb large-scale unexpected losses.


DB – can it really transform in current form

That brings me to DB and the issues are well known. It has a huge cost base problem and is still heavily reliant in the Fixed Income business, which is capital intensive. Further, the scale and scope of its investment banking business has meant that it has been involved in a variety of issues and each requiring significant management attention and – more importantly – exposed the bank to operational risks and large costs. The wealth management business is the bank’s most profitable area and management have failed to divert the capital resources from the investment bank to this unit.

With a cost-to-income ratio of almost 90% and a RoE of about 2%, the scale of the bank’s earnings problem is clear. Given where the stock trades (close to 0.3 times P/TNAV) and level of share price drop, much of the downside risks seem to have been priced in. Credit investors seem to take comfort from the potential intervention of the authorities given its systemic importance.


Conclusion

If any of above three entities were to run into significant difficulty in the next 6-12 months, the impact on the overall credit markets would be dramatic and hence one of the big tail risks to be monitored and risk managed. This, on top of deteriorating liquidity in secondary markets and a general aversion to risk, which will only further amplify spread widening.

Just as an afterthought, there is plenty of talk of a potential DB/Commerzbank merger to create a German national champion bank. Whilst this may yet happen, in my view, the merger is unlikely to solve the underlying issues. In my personal opinion, a more radical idea may be for GS and DB to consider combining their FICC businesses and address the revenue pie shrinkage issue and overall cost problem. That seems very unlikely though given other considerations.

16th December 2018

Don’t buy this dip

Things might not get better… It’s been the most difficult year and, having held on so well for so long, the credit market effectively capitulated in the final quarter. Spread widening accelerated, primary ground to a halt – we believe prematurely –  and total returns gapped lower through a difficult November and December as performance dropped sharply. […]
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13th December 2018

NEW! Bespoke & Ready Made Report service

Independent bespoke portfolio risk consultancy service

CreditMarketDaily.com is pleased to announce a London-based portfolio risk consultancy service focusing on European banks and capital instruments.  Led by GJ Prasad, our resident European bank capital specialist who has covered this segment for 15+ years, our portfolio risk consultancy service provides expert and ‘deep dive’ fundamental analysis on single names that are of topical interest.

This portfolio risk consultancy service is a truly independent and unbiased review of single names (and bonds) held within your portfolio based on a thorough and rigorous fundamental capital structure analysis of the issuer and a complete structural review of the terms and conditions of the bonds.  At the end of this detailed review, we discuss our findings with your team and set out our overall credit opinion.

Read more here


Bank Capital Reports

GJ is also producing full-length credit analysis on individual financial institutions.

The first two are available now here with more to come.

13th December 2018

What drives AT1 valuation? | Bank Capital Insights

Thoughts and observations on an asset class which has peculiar features

What is the single most driver of AT1 valuation – equity metrics, duration, spread premia for inherent credit risks, risk premium for the varied options sold to issuer – coupon deferral, non-call, and potential trigger risks for conversion/writedown? Whilst the right answer is a combination of all of the above factors (and hence very difficult for ordinary folks to decipher) the real and more important answer seems to be liquidity risks (i.e. finding a clearing level) in terms of finding new buyers.  This is especially true when markets focussed on a particular macro tail risk event (say Italian politics or EM contagion) and/or headline risk on the issuer and above-mentioned valuation metrics are thrown out of the window.


Breakdown in correlation

Plus sometimes, the correlation between equity and AT1 breakdowns as different investor bases look at them differently, making it impossible to properly hedge out AT1 price drop risks by shorting equity (in some cases adds to the pain trade as AT1 drops due to lack of buyers and equity jumps on short covering). And trading RV between issuers in AT1 has its own issues as in many cases they are not easily comparable and different issuers have varied valuation factors and RV exposes gross notional risks.


Conclusion

The point being that AT1 was issued to investors in good times as a nice carry trade giving decent yields (relative to risk free assets) but investors failed to appreciate the multi-layered risks in the instrument and more so on liquidity risks in terms of being able to get out (especially in size) when the tide turns.

There is only about EUR 150 billion of issuance to contend with and who knows what will be clearing level on many of these issues if we have a big risk-off event and there is a buyer’s strike. And with limited ability for the market makers to absorb this risk (due to post-financial crisis regulations to carry inventory), my concern is that the overall AT1 market is set for further downside risks (and very limited upside risks) with no where to hide.

Indeed, they will get very attractive when YTP reach 8% and above relative to owning equity. But we are not yet there.

11th December 2018

Equities rally, but few convinced

Prepare for the worst… There was an early strong bounce back in Tuesday’s session following the big losses previously, but it’s clear that any real zest emerging from it is looking short-lived. Just too much water has passed under the bridge recently and there still remains a massive amount of uncertainty emanating from several quarters. […]
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10th December 2018

Brexit farce, markets sink

Under siege amid chaos and confusion… It was all hands to the pump in a session which effectively resulted in yet another near collapse in markets. The massive uncertainty over the Brexit vote continues even after the UK’s PM May incredibly decided to postpone the Brexit vote which was due on Tuesday! It doesn’t really change […]
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10th December 2018

What now for DB credit? Bank Capital

Negative headlines keep on coming…

Headline risk continues to overwhelm DB stock and, over the last few weeks, it has been hit by a plethora of negative news including its involvement in the Danske Bank’s money laundering case, ongoing tax raids by German authorities, cum-dividend issues on ADRs etc. The impact of these relentless negative headlines has had a significant impact on the bank’s stock, which is now trading at less than 0.30 times P/TNAV.

This raises the question – Can the bank afford to absorb large sized settlement and litigation costs that may yet arise from the above issues?   Given the very high cost base (cost to income ratio is 90%), the bank generates very poor operating income to absorb unexpected losses and if revenues were to decline further due to a lack of client activity and ongoing risk aversion, it exposes the bank to negative earnings and hence a potential hit to equity.   The unknown factor in terms of future litigation costs is a key driver of investor pessimism.   In addition, if the bank were to undertake a very large business restructuring this would involve significant one-off costs, which again adds to the pressure on profitability and ultimately capital build.


Capital ratios are the not the issue, leverage is

DB reports good regulatory capital ratios, well above minimum thresholds – but a 4% leverage ratio for a bank with EUR 1,305 billion of leverage exposure is just not good enough, especially if underlying earnings momentum is weak or even negative. For example, in a highly hypothetical situation, if the bank had to take, say, an additional EUR 10 billion of provisions/costs for the matters discussed above, it would create an almost EUR 8 billion capital hit (assuming current revenues hold) and that would translate to the Tier1 capital dropping to EUR 44.5 billion and leverage ratio falling to 3.4%.  Add to this the EUR 23 billion of Level 3 assets and one gets the picture.   And that is why equity investors are nervous.

Yes, the bank has good liquidity buffers and can withstand potential short-term counterparty/deposit flight. But the wall of debt that is maturing over the next few years (almost EUR 20 billion every year until 2022) means that the bank is reliant on wholesale markets being open and available.


Can a merger with Commerzbank make a difference

Press reports over the weekend indicate that the German Government may be considering a merger of Deutsche Bank with Commerzbank to create a large German national champion bank. At first glance, this looks an interesting option to combine two underperforming banks with similar attributes in terms of low profitability and limited future visibility but with significant scope for cost reductions and a larger capital pool to absorb losses.

But merely creating a much larger entity does not solve the underlying core issues faced by both banks, more so for DB; The reason being that the bank is too large and too complex to be managed as a standalone entity and any additional merger will only complicate matters and cause further uncertainty.

DB’s issues stem from multiple factors – oversized/overstaffed businesses in FICC land and a strategic failure in the past to redirect capital to the more profitable wealth management and corporate banking businesses.  FICC is a highly cyclical business and one that is undergoing profound structural change. Technology and automation are the key drivers of profitability in that business and DB has been very slow to react and adapt to the new landscape.  What DB needs is a radical restructuring in the FICC business and it needs to get rid of many units that are currently generating very poor returns – and downsize its balance sheet exposures significantly.


Equity looking down the barrel but credit hoping for better times

Equity investors have taken notice of the issues and hence give the poor valuation on its stock. It seems that credit investors especially AT1 and LT2 investors are stuck in no man’s land and unsure of what to do next (yes, the yields are attractive but there are significant tail risks).

In my personal opinion, the bank’s AT1s are still not fully reflecting the substantial downside risks especially in the unlikely event of PONV (point of no viability) being reached or if there is a significant counterparty run. Coupons may not be at risk for now but it is still an overhang given the low profitability and current levels of ADI.


Can CBK save DB credit investors?

CBK as in Central Bank Kindness and not Commerzbank.

Given the systemic nature of the bank in the global financial system, it is likely that some form of government or central bank support (at least in liquidity) would come through but that will be at a price wherein sub-debt holders will be fully bailed in.

To that extent it seems to me that only the preferred senior part of the capital structure is safe for now (though one may yet get spread widening). I fear that credit investors have still not fully factored the potential downside risks.

9th December 2018

Winter of discontent ahead

Suspicious minds… The attempt at a ‘recovery’ in last week’s final session in the European session was so limp that it was barely worthy.  Later, the US sell-off put paid to any sustainability of it. It actually highlights a nervous market now facing a daunting outlook just as we near the end of this year’s […]


6th December 2018

Stormy… waters

Donning tin hats… Oh dear! The arrest of Huawei’s CFO takes us into a whole new ball game. It’s no longer just macro we need to worry about (in the trade spat between the US and China), but geopolitics now too. China will respond. News of that overnight arrest in Canada took equities in Europe […]
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4th December 2018

Christmas came early!

Turkey cooked too early… The potential for some kind of a tariff deal. US Treasuries yielding less than 3% in the 10-year. A good rally in equities to kick off the month’s proceedings. Even oil prices on the way up. A drive-by, €4.5bn offering in primary taken down well and a feel good factor which, […]
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